MercoPress. South Atlantic News Agency

Can Brazil stop Venezuela from invading Guyana?

President Lula da Silva with his neighbor Nicolás Maduro

By Thiago de Aragão (*) The Brazilian government, eager to assert itself as South America’s preeminent power, finds itself at a crossroads. The victory of libertarian opportunist Javier Milei in Argentina’s recent presidential election has added a new element of uncertainty to Brazil’s relationship with its southern neighbor.

Meanwhile, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s threats to annex Guyana’s oil-rich Essequibo region jeopardize the increasingly fragile alliance between Brazil and its northern neighbor.

These developments have underscored the need for Brazil to focus on maintaining respectful and harmonious relations with its allies and adversaries in Latin America, instead of trying to extend its reach to Europe, the Middle East, and the South China Sea.

Venezuela’s territorial claims in the Essequibo region date back to the early nineteenth century. Though Venezuela initially agreed to the international ruling that established the current border in 1899, when Guyana was still a British colony, it quickly came to regret this decision.

In 2006, Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chávez, audaciously decided to add a star representing Essequibo to the Venezuelan flag. And this month, following a referendum in which Venezuelan voters approved the annexation of Essequibo, Maduro ordered the creation of a new state and presented an updated national map that shows the disputed territory as part of Venezuela.

For Maduro, the current dispute offers a chance to boost his popularity ahead of the 2024 presidential election. Amid rising economic uncertainty, Venezuela faces mounting pressure from increasingly impatient creditors, such as Russia and China, and demanding allies like Iran and Cuba. For the first time in many years, Maduro also faces a somewhat organized political opposition, led by presidential candidate María Corina Machado, who represents the toughest electoral challenge he has faced so far.

To be sure, in Venezuela’s political system, winning is not a straightforward process. Even if he receives fewer votes, Maduro could still use the Venezuelan judicial system, one of the most corrupt and outdated in the region, to manipulate the results. To secure her victory, Machado must win by a larger margin than required in normal elections.

While Maduro’s election strategy is certainly unconventional, it is not unprecedented. His use of the Essequibo dispute mirrors Argentinian General Leopoldo Galtieri’s attempt to quell growing domestic discontent by invading the Falkland Islands in 1982. Of course, Galtieri did not anticipate that British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher – grappling with domestic economic upheaval and a prolonged miners’ strike – would view the crisis as an opportunity to divert attention from her own political struggles and respond with overwhelming military force.

But make no mistake: invading Guyana, or even threatening to do so, is a sign of desperation. Having run out of ideas, Maduro aims to foment nationalist outrage and generate a flurry of domestic and international news stories to divert public attention away from Machado and his own administration’s numerous blunders. Moreover, the crisis provides Maduro with a pretext to postpone setting a date for the presidential election.

If Maduro were genuinely intent on invading Guyana, he would not have resorted to a public referendum or televised speeches. In the context of the 2024 election, the mere threat of an invasion is more valuable than carrying it out. While Guyana’s lack of military capabilities suggests that Venezuela would likely encounter little resistance in an actual conflict, Maduro’s territorial ambitions face a major obstacle: ExxonMobil.

Given that ExxonMobil’s largest foreign investment happens to be in Guyana, an invasion would inevitably cause a direct confrontation between Venezuela and the United States. The US, already grappling with a migrant crisis at its southern border, would do everything it can to avoid a conflict that could trigger another surge of people heading north. Nevertheless, it still has considerable leverage over Maduro. By mobilizing the Venezuelan expatriate community in Florida, the US could undermine whatever remaining legitimacy his regime may have. The impressive ability of numerous expatriates to engage with the Venezuelan dissident press, fund members of the opposition, and organize rallies that catch Maduro’s attention tend to be useful, especially when Maduro wants to recuperate some of his momentum with voters.

Brazil must take the lead in de-escalating tensions. Since the onset of the Ukraine war, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has repeatedly suggested that the conflict could be resolved if Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, would just “sit down” and negotiate. When it comes to the Venezuela-Guyana dispute, Lula’s friendship with Maduro puts him in a unique position to call his Venezuelan counterpart and say, “Stop this nonsense.”

Meanwhile, the election of Milei, who has threatened to withdraw Argentina from the Mercosur bloc and labeled Lula an “angry communist,” has fueled concerns about the future of the relationship between Brazil and its largest trading partner in South America.

Diana Mondino, Milei’s economic adviser and intended foreign minister, recently announced that Argentina will not join the BRICS group in 2024 as planned, creating further uncertainty. At the moment, there is not much that Brazil can do to ease tensions. But Mondino’s recent visit to Brasília offers a glimmer of hope that the two countries may be able to set aside their disagreements and maintain commercial relations.

Milei’s presidency will serve as a crucial test for Lula’s leadership. For the first time, Brazil faces the prospect of a major trading partner governed by a leader who is openly hostile. Just as he has softened his hardline stance toward China, Milei will likely realize over the next few months that quarreling with Brazil is counterproductive. Meanwhile, Lula must demonstrate the diplomatic acumen required to maintain functional trade relations. In dealing with both Venezuela and Argentina, Brazil’s strategy must rely on two key principles: pragmatism and efficiency.

(*) Thiago de Aragão, executive director of Public Affairs at Arko Advice, is a senior research associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. This column was distributed by Project Syndicate (www.project-syndicate.org).